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Abstract
Kant’s Critical philosophy solves Descartes’ mind-body problem, replacing the dual-
ism of the “physical influx” theory he defended in his early career. Kant’s solution, like 
all Critical theories, is “perspectival,” acknowledging deep truth in both opposing 
extremes. Minds are not separate from bodies, but a manifestation of them, each 
viewed from a different perspective. Kant’s transcendental conditions of knowledge 
portray the mind not as creating the physical world, but as necessarily structuring our 
knowledge of objects with a set of unconscious assumptions; yet our pre-conscious 
(pre-mental) encounter with an assumed spatio-temporal, causal nexus is entirely 
physical. Hence, today’s “eliminative materialism” and “folk psychology” are both 
ways of considering this age-old issue, neither being an exclusive explanation. A 
Kantian solution to this version of the mind-body problem is: eliminative materialism 
is good science; but only folk psychologists can consistently be eliminative material-
ists. Indeed, the mind-body problem exemplifies a feature of all cultural situations: 
 dialogue between opposing perspectives is required for understanding as such 
to arise.
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 Eliminative Materialism as a Challenge to Kant’s Apparent Dualism
Readers of Immanuel Kant’s great work, Critique of Pure Reason – whether 
or not they regard themselves as Kantians – tend to assume that his position 
entails some form of mind-body dualism.1 After all, his ground-breaking “tran-
scendental idealism” argues that the mind imposes necessary and universal 
conditions onto the physical world as we know it. Kant’s insistence that good 
philosophy must start with the assumption that space and time are mental 
constructs (dubbed “forms of intuition”), his frequent appeal to a distinction 
between the “phenomenal” and “noumenal” worlds, and his incessant use of 
terms referring to a complex array of mental faculties, all suggest that he was 
merely adopting, rather than transcending, the legacy bequeathed to him by 
Descartes. Indeed, many would regard Kant’s position as a dualist alternative 
to the anti-Cartesian monism, known as “eliminative materialism” ( hereafter 
“EM”), that some philosophers, most notably Patricia Churchland, have 
defended in recent years.
EM emerged during the last quarter of the twentieth century as one of the 
most radical and controversial theories of mind-brain identity. At its heart is 
an assumption about the role of concepts that refer to mental states and a pre-
diction regarding the future progress of neuroscience. The assumption is two-
fold: first, dualism is grounded in what proponents of EM call “folk psychology” 
(i.e., the commonsense view that our mental states, especially our desires and 
beliefs, are causes of the behavior that we regard as self-consciously ours);2 sec-
ond, folk psychology functions as a theory when used in such an explanatory 
1   The examples that could be cited here are myriad. Particularly ironic among the illustrious 
list of those who see Kant as a dualist are those whose attempt to defend an account of the 
embodied mind that could have been significantly buttressed by recognizing that Kant can be 
read in a very different way. One of the best examples of this subgroup is the book by George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). For a critique of their approach, see my book 
review in Journal of Scientific Exploration 24, 2 (Summer 2010): 323-327.
2   This use of the term “folk psychology” assumes that the common-sense understanding of 
the causal role of mental states is similar to other folk theories that have appeared to be self-
evident, until hard scientific evidence demonstrated otherwise. For example, folk cosmology 
claimed that the earth is flat and that the sun revolves around it, until Copernicus’ alterna-
tive theory gained empirical confirmation. Proponents of EM cite various examples of folk 
theories that have been debunked. See for example, Patricia S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: 
Toward a Unified Theory of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986), 290 and 
300-301. She defines a “folk theory” in general as an “intuitive framework” for understanding 
some aspect of our human experience (288).
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way. The prediction EM makes is that brain research will eventually become 
sufficiently sophisticated to enable neuroscientists, perhaps with the help of 
some empirically-minded philosophers, to develop a complete theory of the 
causal relationship between brain functioning and human behavior. Once this 
occurs, folk psychology will be reducible to brain science, so that references to 
our “desires” and “beliefs” will have no more literal truth than references to the 
sun “rising” over the eastern horizon of the earth. In short, the core prediction 
of EM is that the human brain is smarter than it is complicated.3
Among the many empirical facts cited to support EM is that the human 
mind-brain enables us to perform many highly complex tasks without the 
involvement of a conscious “ego” directing its processes. While examples of 
such facts could be taken from a wide variety of common human experiences, 
from speaking to the mechanics of walking or driving a car, an example that 
is particularly relevant in philosophical circles is given in a recent magazine 
article detailing the life and thought of the contemporary British philoso-
pher, Derek Parfit. The author describes Parfit’s normal approach to writing as 
follows:
He doesn’t believe that his conscious mind is responsible for the impor-
tant parts of his work. He pictures his thinking self as a government min-
ister sitting behind a large desk, who writes a question on a piece of paper 
and puts it in his out-tray. The minister then sits idly at the desk, twid-
dling his thumbs, while in some back room civil servants labor furiously, 
come up with the answer, and place it in his in-tray.4
While perhaps not everyone has the good fortune to be able to come up with 
creative philosophical ideas in this way, we do all deal with a wide variety of 
other complex tasks in much the same way, hardly giving a single (conscious) 
thought to what we are doing. How is this possible? If EM is correct, the answer 
lies solely in the workings of the brain: we will eventually realize that such 
examples describe the norm, not an exception, because even the ego is  actually 
one of the “civil servants” whose tasks collectively constitute the human brain.
Almost as if she were attempting to account for this biographical description 
of creative thinking, Churchland describes the brain as consisting of “suitably 
orchestrated throngs of stupid things,” observing that “it seems quite shocking 
3   Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 316; she readily admits, however, that “the brain . . . may be 
more complicated than it is smart” (374).
4   Larissa MacFarquhar, “How to be Good,” The New Yorker (September 5, 2011): 42-53; quote 
from page 44.
 197Kant’s Perspectival Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
Culture and dialogue 4 (2016) 194-213
that one’s cleverness should be the outcome of well-orchestrated stupidity.”5 
Churchland (and EM in general) claims this requires us to unlearn our belief 
in a controlling “self.” However, these very insights regarding the workings of 
the brain might point not to complete eradication of the human self, but to 
its redefinition, in much the same way that Jung attempted to replace Freud’s 
conviction, that the conscious “ego” ought to be in control of one’s mental life, 
with the new conviction that the path to genuine psychological health is the 
ability to trust in our awareness of a “Self” that is greater than any conscious 
“ego.” On the interpretation of Kant that I shall present below, this higher “Self” 
can be identified with the body. Neuroscience will begin to dovetail nicely with 
philosophy when it recognizes that the brain itself trusts the body for virtually 
all of its functioning, just as Jung says the ego must trust the Self-archetype.6
Because Kant never considered the challenge EM poses to philosophers, at 
least not in such an extreme form, we cannot be certain just how he would 
have responded. My goal here, therefore, is not to argue that Kant would 
either endorse or reject EM per se, but to defend two claims: (1) transcen-
dental philosophy can be conceived, like EM, as anti-dualist; and (2) without 
being supplemented by a key feature of Kant’s theory of mind (one that is not 
inconsistent with any essential feature of EM – namely, his claim that reflec-
tive perspectives are necessary for the possibility of human understanding), EM 
cannot be consistently maintained. If my argument is correct, then at the very 
least, Kantians and eliminative materialists ought to remain in close dialogue, 
if representatives of either camp wish to arrive at an accurate understanding 
of the workings of the human mind-brain.7
Many would expect Kant, with his reputation as an adherent of Cartesian 
dualism, to be among the last modern philosophers to whom we might turn for 
insight into the question of how best to defend a theory of mind-brain identity. 
However, Kant scholars over the past few decades have made considerable 
progress in dispelling the myth of Kant the naive Cartesian dualist.8 While not 
explicitly addressing the mind-brain issue, Henry Allison’s 1983 book, Kant’s 
5   Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 407.
6   For further discussion of Jung’s position, see Stephen Palmquist, Dreams of Wholeness: A 
Course of Introductory Lectures on Religion, Psychology and Personal Growth2 (Hong Kong: 
Philopsychy Press, 2008 [1997]), chs. 6-7.
7   Given this more modest (but still quite ambitious) goal, I suspect that, despite my best efforts 
to argue otherwise, some proponents of EM might respond in the end that all I have done is 
to confirm their suspicions that Kant was a dualist after all.
8   A good discussion of the myth of Kant the Cartesian dualist can be found in Arthur W. 
Collins, Possible Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 5-9 and passim. 
See also Helge Svare, Body and Practice in Kant (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).
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Transcendental Idealism,9 has persuaded many contemporary Kant-scholars 
that what looks like an untenable ontological dualism defined by two distinct 
worlds (the phenomenal and the noumenal) is properly understood as two dis-
tinct perspectives on one and the same world: the physical world of our every-
day experience. My 1993 book, Kant’s System of Perspectives,10 formalized the 
perspectival approach and extended it to Kant’s entire Critical System, arguing 
that Kant’s ultimate goal in philosophizing was to articulate an idea of human 
nature as a unified whole. In that work, however, I did not provide a detailed 
explanation of how Kant’s new, perspectival approach transcends Cartesian 
dualism. Not unlike the charge often leveled against EM, Kant appears to be 
changing the subject of philosophy so radically that he often simply ignores the 
old mind-body problem. Fortunately, 1993 also saw the publication of Alison 
Laywine’s thoroughgoing study demonstrating how the issue of soul-body 
interaction was the chief philosophical focus of Kant’s pre-1770 (what I call his 
“pre-Copernican”11) writings.12 (What is left unclear by that study is just how 
Kant’s mature Critical philosophy allowed him to transcend his early dualist 
position.) And since then a number of excellent studies have been published, 
arguing that Kant was far more body-oriented than has often been assumed.13 
These have helped to dispel the impression of many previous commentators, 
9    Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). For a critique of Allison’s position, see Kenneth R. 
Westphal, “Freedom and the Distinction Between Phenomena and Noumena: Is Allison’s 
View Methodological, Metaphysical, or Equivocal?,” Journal of Philosophical Research 26 
(2001): 593-622.
10   Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An architectonic interpretation of the 
Critical Philosophy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
11   In Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000), §II.1, I argue that the convention of calling the years before 1770 Kant’s “pre-Critical” 
period is a misnomer: a proper understanding of Kant’s term, “Critical” (i.e., its ground-
ing in a three-step process of resolving philosophical problems, whereby one considers 
two opposing positions then resolves the opposition by referring to a third position that 
synthesizes the first two), enables us to trace Critical strains in his philosophy from his 
very first publication to the last. The new feature introduced in (or around) 1770 is what 
he refers to in the second Preface to the first Critique as his Copernican hypothesis (Bxvif, 
Bxxiin).
12   Alison Laywine, Kant’s Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy 
(Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1993), 52 and 159.
13   See especially Susan Meld Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, 
and Community (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). Svare, Body and Practice in 
Kant, 3n, lists several other key authors who have also emphasized the importance of 
embodiment for Kant.
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that Kant was not only a dualist but, largely because of the somewhat strict 
moral theory defended in his second Critique, also a body-hater.14
Again, my purpose here will be not be so grand as to claim that Kant him-
self was a confirmed physicalist, explicitly defending mind-brain identity. 
This would be too extreme, for his discussion of mind-body interaction in the 
Paralogisms (especially A381-96) presents an idealist solution, consistently 
using language that seems to assume that mental states really exist. Rather, 
more modestly, my purpose will be to explore whether Kant’s mature Critical 
philosophy is consistent with mind-body identity, and whether Kant has any 
insights that might challenge those who affirm an extreme form of EM to cor-
rect potential defects in their own philosophy of mind.
 Kant on the Brain in Dreams of a Spirit Seer
Before examining how the Critique of Pure Reason defends an alternative to 
Kant’s youthful dualism, and how his transcendental idealism can be under-
stood as overcoming dualism entirely, let us look briefly at a book that I believe 
marks the crucial turning-point in his philosophical development: Dreams of a 
Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766). In his earliest writings, 
Kant defended a theory of “physical influx,” whereby the soul has quasi-mate-
rial characteristics, such as impenetrability.15 Having learned of Swedenborg’s 
amazing visions in the early 1760s, Kant read some of the mystic’s explana-
tions of how such visions occur. In Dreams we witness Kant grappling with the 
uncomfortable fact that Swedenborg held a vulgar version of the same dual-
ist metaphysics that he himself had been promoting. As a result, Kant tells us 
toward the end of this much-neglected early work, he found it necessary to 
give up his formerly naive reliance on “the butterfly-wings of metaphysics” – 
presumably this included his dualist theory of mind-body interaction – and 
remain “on the humble ground of experience and common sense,” where we 
“devote ourselves to what is useful.”16 He then foreshadows his intention to 
14   As the examples of this tendency are legion, a single reference will suffice: Laura 
Hengehold, in The Body Problematic: Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 7-8, says Kant “protected his 
sense of moral integrity and autonomy against inclinations associated with the body.”
15   See Laywine, Kant’s Early Metaphysics, 25-42, for a detailed account of this position. I 
summarize and assess Laywine’s arguments in Kant’s Critical Religion, Appendix II.2.
16   Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, tr. David 
Walford with Ralf Meerbote, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 368.
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perform a thoroughgoing critique of reason’s cognitive powers that will deter-
mine “the limits imposed upon [science] by the nature of human reason.”17
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Kant’s last major publication prior to the appear-
ance of his Critique of Pure Reason some 15 years later,18 advances a cutting 
criticism of his formerly cherished theory of physical influx. Without rehears-
ing the details of that theory or why Kant came to recognize it as fundamen-
tally flawed, I shall limit my attention here to a single passage from Chapter I, 
where he explicitly discusses the question of whether it makes sense to locate 
the “soul” (and its mental capacities) in a particular part of the body. His poi-
gnant answer appeals to the limits of the brain’s role in human thinking and is 
worth quoting at length:
The body, the alterations of which are my alterations – this body is my 
body; and the place of that body is at the same time my place. If one pur-
sued the question further and asked: Where then is your place (that of the 
soul) in this body? Then I should suspect there was a catch in the ques-
tion. For it is easy to see that the question already presupposes some-
thing with which we are not acquainted through experience, though it 
may perhaps be based on imaginary inferences. The question presup-
poses, namely, that my thinking ‘I’ is in a place which is distinct from 
the places of the other parts of that body which belongs to my self. But 
no one is immediately conscious of [occupying] a particular place in his 
body; one is only immediately conscious of the space which one occupies 
relatively to the world around. I would therefore rely on ordinary experi-
ence and say, for the time being: Where I feel, it is there that I am. I am as 
immediately in my finger-tip as I am in my head. It is I myself whose heel 
hurts, and whose heart beats with emotion . . . No experience teaches me 
to regard some parts of my sensation of myself as remote from me. Nor 
does any experience teach me to imprison my indivisible ‘I’ in a micro-
scopically tiny region of the brain, either so as to operate from there the 
17   Kant, Dreams, 369. Only when these “boundary-stones” are “securely fixed” (369), 
Kant assures us, will metaphysics finally become “that which it is far from being at the 
moment . . ., namely, the companion of wisdom.”
18   In 1768 Kant published his short essay “Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der 
Gegenden im Raume”, and in 1770 he wrote the “Inaugural Dissertation” (De mundi sen-
sibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis) that was required when he took up a profes-
sorship at the University of Königsberg. While the latter on its own cannot properly be 
regarded as a “major work,” many of its most important arguments did form the backbone 
of the first Critique, eleven years later. Other than these two works, Kant published noth-
ing more than a few short notices during this 15 year period.
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levers governing my body-machine, or so as myself to be affected in that 
region by the workings of that machinery.19
While this quotation on its own is not enough to demonstrate that by 1766 
Kant had shaken off the cloak of dualism, it does provide some crucial inspira-
tion for the view I shall support here; in any case, it demonstrates that at this 
point in his life, during his early 40s, he had explicitly identified any thought of 
himself as having, first and foremost (if not entirely), a physical reference – to 
his fingers and feet as well as to his head and heart.
Without further elaboration and interpretation, the foregoing passage pres-
ents admittedly thin evidence for an anti-dualist position, especially since 
Kant seems to affirm that his “soul” consists of an “indivisible ‘I’ ” that might be 
metaphysically distinct from the body. Nevertheless, he is here identifying his 
awareness of that “I” with his awareness of his body and explicitly states that 
the “I” itself might be a product of merely “imaginary inferences” – a position 
tantalizingly consistent with EM. Taking this hint as a starting-point, I shall 
argue that, far from being simply a further development of Cartesian dualism, 
Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy advances an alternative to any 
form of mind-body dualism by demonstrating that, from the point of view of 
any legitimate natural science, I just am my body.
In the course of defending this radical position, however, Kant also argued 
that there is one and only one way to defend it consistently, and that is to rec-
ognize that, out of this very body that is me arise forms of knowledge whose 
validity is entirely independent of my physical nature. This position does not 
make Kant a dualist, nor even an epiphenomenalist, provided we keep in mind 
the perspectival character of his philosophy: although these special, “tran-
scendental” forms of knowledge are all-important from one perspective (the 
one that matters most to philosophy), from another perspective (the one that 
matters most to science) they are imaginary ideas that paradoxically cannot 
be said to exist at all! This is why Kant calls them both “transcendental” and 
“ideal”: we must assume them, for they are the source of all meaning, yet their 
necessity and universality have no empirical grounding. Because we need these 
forms in order to explain what we know, I suggest we call this aspect of his posi-
tion “explanatory idealism.” To unpack the perplexing implications of Kant’s 
two-sided position, we must move beyond his pre-Copernican period and 
examine the key features of the Critique of Pure Reason.
19   Kant, Dreams, 324-325 (all but the second emphasis added).
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 Kant’s Perspectival Alternative to Cartesian Dualism
Kant begins the Preface to the first edition of the first Critique with the tanta-
lizing claim that human reason is inevitably caught up in a highly problematic 
way of thinking: one that it cannot dispense with, even though it is entirely 
groundless as a description of empirical reality. He identifies this system of 
thinking as “metaphysics,” saying the goal of his book will be to examine the 
powers and limits of human reason, thus enabling the reader at least to be 
aware of the illusory nature of traditional metaphysical ideas, even though 
their effects on our thinking will remain in place. I can here only briefly outline 
Kant’s critical philosophy of mind, highlighting those features that most clearly 
demonstrate its monistic emphasis. As we shall see, the illusion Kant unveils is 
remarkably similar to the illusion EM predicts will someday be dispelled: that 
what we have become accustomed to calling our “mind” is something separate 
or distinct from our body.
In the first Critique’s first major section, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant 
famously (or on most accounts, infamously) argues that space and time are not 
to be viewed as absolute containers (as Newton had claimed), nor as mere sys-
tems of relations between objects (as Leibniz had argued), but rather as “forms 
of intuition.” Exactly what he meant by this obscure term has been, and will no 
doubt continue to be, a matter of considerable debate. But he explicitly states 
that he is not defending a form of idealism even remotely similar to Berkeley’s, 
whereby space and time have no empirical reality outside of our perceptions 
(see B70-71). The fact that Kant appeals throughout the Aesthetic to various 
examples of perceived objects, as being externally given to the human subject 
in the process of experiencing them, suggests that his special term refers to 
the requirements of our bodily functioning.20 Rukgaber defends this position 
in detail, arguing that Kantian “intuition” is another term for what we might 
nowadays call “qualitative sensation processing,” while “forms of intuition” are 
“an account of the structure of our embodied perspective” on the world.21
To set the background for the arguments of the first Critique, Rukgaber 
appeals to Kant’s 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts,22 where Kant uses 
the right and left hands to illustrate how “directionality . . . is provided through 
the mediation of the body.” The same fundamental appeal to the body occurs in 
Kant’s 1786 essay, “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” Rukgaber 
20   See e.g., B70n. See also note 33, below.
21   Matthew S. Rukgaber, “ ‘The Key to Transcendental Philosophy’: Space, Time and the Body 
in Kant,” Kant-Studien 100 (2009): 166-186; quoting from pages 167 and 166.
22   Ibid., 172. Cf. note 18, above.
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claims that in this essay Kant views our bodily senses as constituting “the ‘pro-
jection’ of an intuitional field” through the power of “a priori intuition,” under-
stood now as a person’s “bodily grasp on the field of possible spatio-temporal 
relations that we have by virtue of being an embodied creature.”23 In Kant’s 
theory “the relation of the given to the larger spatial frame” is transformed from 
a secondary feature of our experience to the primary issue of philosophical 
interest; this is a form of idealism because “the whole of space” is now regarded 
as “relative to our perspective” – i.e., to our “representational system.”24
Along these lines, Kant argues in the first Critique (A26/B42) that “we can 
accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human 
standpoint.” Kant’s primary concern is not with the concept of space (as 
claimed by those such as Allison and Falkenstein, who see the emphasis of 
Kant’s argument as primarily psychological), but with how our “representa-
tion of space” serves “as the ground of all concrete spatial determinations”: 
“A priori intuition precedes psychology, because it is the frame in which all 
possible experience – even psychological experience – emerges.”25 The com-
mon assumption “that the form of inner intuition is identical to the flow of 
empirical consciousness results in multiple contradictions within Kant’s text.”26 
A better interpretation, Rukgaber argues, is to read Kant as “describing some-
thing like a general, indeterminate temporal background to events” – both 
inner (so-called “mental”) and outer (so-called “physical”) events – with the 
key factor defining this background (namely, “successiveness”) emerging “from 
our capacity for self-movement . . . In other words, time also emerges from a 
bodily foundation.”27 Kant’s repeated references to time as being like “a line 
that is infinitely progressing . . . in space” are also grounded in “the feeling of 
our own possible movement along an axis of the body.”28 Rukgaber finds the 
same view operating in Kant’s Opus Postumum, which also depicts “a priori 
intuition [as] the way in which the active body projects a structured, intu-
itional, spatio-temporal background against which objects emerge.”29 On this 
reading, Kant’s basic claim in the Aesthetic is that “The forms of intuition are 
23   Ibid., 173.
24   Ibid., 174 and 178.
25   Ibid., 176-177. This “framing of all possible experience” (177), he adds, is “an ideal projec-
tion tied to the formal structure of our perspective.”
26   Ibid., 180.
27   Ibid.
28   Ibid., 181.
29   Ibid., 183. In this final (unfinished) work, Kant was to some extent responding to Schelling 
(184), in the sense that he posits “a deep connection between the materiality of the sub-
ject and the materiality of nature.”
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not mental operations performed on sense data but are the formal structure of 
spatio-temporal relations in which objects stand in relation to the body.”30 As 
such, this first stage of Kant’s theoretical system sets out the basis for “a rudi-
mentary physics” that is primarily ontological and thus physical in its empha-
sis, not merely epistemological and mental.31
One of the most important implications of the Transcendental Aesthetic is 
that, as far as our pre-conceptual experience is concerned, so-called “self-knowl-
edge” does not occupy any privileged position in relation to our knowledge 
of the external world.32 Descartes had argued, of course, that our knowledge 
of the external world is mediated through our senses and therefore always 
open to doubt, whereas our knowledge of our own thoughts is immediate and 
therefore indubitable. By contrast, Kant’s theory of space and time as forms of 
intuition leads him to distinguish between what he calls outer sense and inner 
sense. Insofar as introspection gives us access to perceptions and/or thought-
processes that occur in time, Kant portrays self-knowledge as empirical and 
acknowledges that it, too, may well turn out to be mistaken.33 We may think we 
observe ourselves believing or desiring a certain thing, but evidence to the con-
trary might emerge, demonstrating that our presumed self- knowledge is not 
infallible after all. This crucial insight has important implications for Kant’s 
later, moral and religious writings, where he insists that our knowledge of a 
person’s inner conviction (Gesinnung) and of the motives that make it what it 
30   Ibid., 185.
31   Rukgaber admits that Kant’s position has elements of both. He backs up his radical 
claim by pointing out that in his 1783 sequel to the first Critique, appropriately titled 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will Present itself as a Science (bold type 
added), Kant explicitly claims that the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic answer 
the question: “How is nature possible in general in the material sense . . .?” (Prolegomena, 
318; emphasis added). Kant’s answer, according to Rukgaber (“The Key to Transcendental 
Philosophy,” 186), is “that our perspective, part of which is our being embodied material 
beings, is a condition on the possibility of nature itself.”
32   Churchland briefly mentions this interesting point (in Neurophilosophy, 248-249), but 
does not develop it.
33   Kant refers to perceptual illusions on several occasions; see e.g., B69-70, A295/B351-352, 
A297/B353-354. At one point, he explicitly states that the situation regarding inner sense 
and outer sense is “exactly the same” (B67); tr. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). That his discussion of the senses is meant to be under-
stood as a discussion of the body is implied in numerous passages, such as when he 
describes “a representation of sense” as a “force of nature” (A294/B350). In direct opposi-
tion to Descartes, he insists that “the senses do not err” (A293/B350); for as part of the 
physical mechanism as nature, “they do not judge at all.”
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is, even in the case of our own motives, is never perfectly clear and distinct34 – as 
Descartes and the whole rationalist tradition had taken such inner observa-
tions to be. While we will not be able to explore the implications of this point 
for moral philosophy here, it is important to note that Kant’s doubts regarding 
the moral agent’s ability to judge his or her own self-worth are grounded in 
what can only properly be regarded as a monistic view of human sensibility: 
although we do have two forms of sense, inner and outer, both are necessarily 
and universally subjected to the spatio-temporal form of all human intuition 
that defines the human standpoint; any knowledge-claims made on the basis 
of either one must therefore be contingent and open to revision.
The implications of this bodily grounding of all mental functioning can be 
traced throughout virtually every step of Kant’s theoretical system. In the next 
main section of the first Critique, the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts, 
Kant appeals to the human imagination as the power that enables us to form 
concepts out of the raw material presented to us by what he calls “the manifold 
of intuition” – i.e., the unorganized content that is the pre-conscious predeces-
sor of our conscious perceptions. If we accept that this “manifold” refers to 
our bodily functioning, then Kant’s arguments take on a distinctly anti-Carte-
sian flavor. In the first edition, Kant describes the following three-step process 
(A94): “(1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis 
of the manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis 
through original apperception.” The first step is entirely physical, for as we 
have seen, the a priori forms (space and time) arise out of our body’s encoun-
ter with the world around it. The second step argues that our bodily sensations 
must be weaved together in such a way that we form images of them; noth-
ing in Kant’s text prevents us from seeing this process as entirely a function 
of the brain. In the second edition Kant distinguishes between two aspects 
of this second step: the “productive” and the “reproductive” imagination. The 
purpose of this distinction is to point out that our mind-brain processes these 
sensation-based images in two very different ways: first, by producing them; 
second, by re-producing them, in the form of what we normally call “memory.” 
Neuroscience has provided strong evidence that the brain has a great deal to 
do with both processes.
The third step will be the basis, toward the end of this article, for a challenge 
I will pose to EM. The synthesis of bodily sensations to produce images, that in 
turn form the content of our memory, does not suffice to produce knowledge 
34   In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), for example, Kant says “the depth 
of the heart (the subjective first basis of [a person’s] maxims) is inscrutable” (51; tr. Werner 
S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009]).
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of objects all on its own. For that, we must bring this synthesis to a “unity,” 
a requirement that is fulfilled by a power Kant calls “apperception” – i.e., a 
metaphorical “perception” of one’s self as a knowing subject. That Kant associ-
ates this power with our sense of “I,” even employing Descartes’ term, “ego,” 
is one of the primary reasons so many readers merely assume he is adopting 
Cartesian dualism. But this common way of reading Kant’s theory of apper-
ception ignores the fact that, from its first introduction and throughout his 
theoretical system, the kind of apperception Kant defends is transcendental. 
By calling this “I” the transcendental ego, Kant means to imply that there is 
nothing substantial about it; that is, it does not exist in space and time, so it 
is not a mental or “soulish” correlate to our physical existence. Like every a 
priori element of his theoretical system, the transcendental ego is ideal; this 
means that, as far as our physical existence is concerned, its status is that of a 
necessary presupposition – a concept we impose onto our experience in order 
to explain what we have come to know. In this case, it is the presupposition 
that every image produced by my imagination (which might end up meaning: 
by the relevant part of my mind-brain) is my image and, when connected to a 
concrete synopsis (cf. the first step), my perception.
The first chapter of the first Critique’s Transcendental Dialectic explicitly 
rejects Descartes’ theory that the soul is a substance, equal and opposite to the 
body. Many interpreters have assumed that Kant’s arguments in the Dialectic 
reject the idea of the soul altogether. However, Julian Wuerth persuasively dem-
onstrates that those arguments focus on attacking the substantiality of the soul 
and that Kant himself consistently affirms a belief in the other basic character-
istics of the soul throughout his corpus.35 This does not necessarily contradict 
the argument I am presenting here, but merely raises the question: if the soul 
is not a spiritual “substance,” then what is it? Kant says that if this refers to the 
soul “in itself” (A684/B712), then “the question would have no sense at all.” My 
claim is that EM’s response (i.e., that the soul is an illusion created by certain 
brain states that have yet to be discovered and/or completely understood) is 
not inconsistent with Kant’s position, at least as an account of what a science of 
the soul might look like. For in a similar way, Kant replaces the Cartesian soul 
with what he calls the empirical ego. A much-neglected implication of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is that this empirical ego is subject to the limiting con-
ditions of time and space just as much as are our bodily sensations. Kant him-
self tends to assume that it is more closely connected to our inner sense than 
35   Julian Wuerth, “The First Paralogism, its Origin, and its Evolution: Kant on How the Soul 
Both Is and Is Not a Substance,” in Stephen R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: 
Kant and Asian Philosophy (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 157-166.
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to our outer sense, and therefore treats the temporal limitation as more basic 
than the spatial limitation. Admittedly, this could pose a problem for someone 
who wished to defend both Kant’s philosophy of mind and EM. But I suspect 
Kant, if presented with this potential conflict, would give a response entirely 
consistent with EM: we must leave the outcome of this issue to be decided by 
empirical research.
Interestingly, one inference that Kant himself drew from his theory of the 
empirical ego, for which he has often been criticized, actually renders his posi-
tion more amenable to EM: Kant denied that empirical psychology could ever 
become a science.36 As various critics have pointed out (see note 36), Kant’s 
position on this issue did not make sufficient room for the possibility of either 
a behaviorist approach or approaches focusing on empirical manifestations of 
the so-called unconscious, such as the Freudian and Jungian use of dream texts 
as objective content for scientific analysis (see note 6). But his main point was 
that introspection cannot be the basis for a reliable empirical psychology, for 
the very reason that it suffers from all the contingencies of any spatio-temporal 
experience, yet lacks (on its own) the external manifestation that enables sci-
entists to test and verify it using objective methods. (I shall comment further 
on the latter possibility, below.) Believing he had destroyed the foundation for 
a science of rational psychology by refuting Descartes’ notion of a substantial 
soul, Kant assumed that the only thing left for empirical psychology to research 
would be the contents of human introspection, which could not, as such, ever 
be accessible to external observation, as is required for a science to be empiri-
cal. As we have seen, the primary claim of EM is that folk psychology is a theory 
(i.e., an attempt to regard desires and beliefs as scientifically justifiable explana-
tions of human behavior) that is weak and unreliable, and that it will therefore 
probably end up being replaced some day by a complex, neurologically-based 
account of why we do what we do. For my purposes here, it will suffice merely 
to express an opinion: Kant’s rationale for predicting that psychology (as intro-
spection) would never establish itself as an empirical science is compatible 
with, if not identical to, EM’s prediction that folk psychology will eventually be 
reduced to neuroscience.
36   Kant’s most explicit denial occurs in the Preface of his Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science (1786); his discussion of empirical psychology in the first Critique is 
more open-ended (A848-849/B876-877; see also A347/B405-406 and A682-684/B710-712). 
Thomas Sturm, “Kant on Empirical Psychology: How Not to Investigate the Human Mind,” 
in Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant on the Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 163-
184, argues that Kant’s denial is based on a very narrow conception of what constitutes a 
natural science, and on a limited view of what empirical psychology entails.
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Backtracking from the Dialectic in the text of the first Critique, we find 
several other key aspects of Kant’s theoretical system that are explicitly 
body-based.37 Of these, by far the most explicit comes toward the end of the 
Analytic of Principles, in the section called the Refutation of Idealism. Kant 
there argues that our self-awareness arises first and foremost out of our bodily 
experiences, and that our awareness of having a mental life arises only as an 
offshoot from this physical grounding. Kant added this section in the second 
(1787) edition in order to refute early interpreters who had mistakenly identi-
fied his transcendental idealism with Berkeley’s empirical idealism. According 
to the latter, the very existence of the physical world can be called into ques-
tion, because we have intimate knowledge only of our own mental life. But 
for Kantian idealism, exactly the opposite holds: we know the physical world 
most intimately, so if we wish to doubt either side of Cartesian dualism, the 
empirical reality of our mental life must fall by the wayside. Here Kant’s posi-
tion virtually foreshadows EM.
A likely objection to this way of reading Kant is that the second Critique 
presents the noumenal world as the basis for our moral life, and morality as 
the source of the meaning of human life in general, so Kant could not have 
countenanced EM’s total reduction of the mental to the physical. A complete 
response to this objection would be too lengthy to be attempted here. But in a 
nutshell, a Kantian defender of EM might respond that in the second chapter 
of the first Critique’s Dialectic (in the Third Antinomy), Kant acknowledges 
deep problems in treating freedom as a cause within the nexus of the empiri-
cal world. Whatever Kant meant by “free will” in the second Critique, and by 
the claim that it is the one “fact” of practical reason, he did not mean that 
noumenal causality interrupts the phenomenal causality required by empirical 
science. Our moral convictions, however their noumenal standpoint is to be 
philosophically justified, do not give us license to disrupt the causal nexus that 
the Analytic of Principles demonstrates to be a necessary condition for empiri-
cal knowledge. Instead, Kant’s justification would begin by reminding us that 
even the transcendental principles that enable us to explain our  empirical 
37   One of the most interesting of these key features, though beyond the scope of this article 
to explore, is Kant’s theory of the twelve categories and their schematization as “princi-
ples” that define the mental presuppositions we must adopt, in order to explain what we 
know about the physical world. Typically regarded as the most immaterial stage of Kant’s 
entire theoretical system, this theory lies at the very core of transcendental idealism’s 
grounding in the body, argues Svare (Body and Practice in Kant, especially chapters 9-11).
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knowledge are ideal (i.e., not empirically based), so that in this respect the 
phenomenal is neither more nor less securely grounded than the noumenal.38
 Two Challenges to Eliminative Materialism
In concluding these reflections on Kant’s body-centered approach in the first 
Critique, we must recall where Kant started in the first Preface, by acknowledg-
ing the inevitability of metaphysical illusions. To avoid being fooled by such 
 illusions, Kant says we must learn to think perspectivally. This means recogniz-
ing that, when we create ideas, they can carry a heavy load of meaning from 
one (explanatory) perspective even though from another (physical or substan-
tive) perspective, the object of such ideas might not literally “exist.” Once we 
grasp the perspectival nature of Kant’s affirmation of the body, we can recog-
nize that his position challenges EM in at least two ways.
First, the passage quoted in the second section, above, from Dreams of a 
Spirit-Seer, suggests that Kant would be extremely skeptical about EM’s basic 
prediction ever coming to pass, as long as scientific research focuses exclu-
sively on the brain. For Kant thought it was a fundamental mistake to assume 
that “I” somehow live in my brain. The brain’s functions may be – nowadays we 
can say are (at least as far as we know) – essential to the experience of what 
we call “mental states”; but to hold out the hope that the mind will someday be 
reduced to the brain is no more plausible today than was the hope of locating 
the soul in the brain in the days of Descartes and Kant. Ironically, on this point 
the typical eliminative materialist is in danger of looking more like Descartes 
than Kant does! The first challenge to EM, therefore, is to recognize that the 
whole body is the source of our feeling of having a distinct “mental life,” so 
that unless neurology is extended and supplemented by an understanding of 
how each part of our body complements and feeds into the brain in such a 
way that the body controls the brain just as much as the brain controls the body, 
the prediction that forms the basis of EM is doomed to remain unrealized. In 
other words, it is not and never will be the brain on its own that turns out to be 
smarter than it is complicated, but rather, the brain and body functioning as a 
creative feedback loop and thereby constituting the whole person.
Churchland reports a 1950 experiment with monkeys that may have some 
bearing on this first challenge. Scientists located an area of a monkey’s brain 
38   For a perspectival interpretation of Kant’s infamous theory of noumenal causality, see 
section IV of my article, “Kant’s Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral 
Problems with Divine Assistance,” The Journal of Religion 90, 4 (October 2010): 530-553.
210 Palmquist
Culture and dialogue 4 (2016) 194-213
that controlled thumb movement and removed it, producing temporary paral-
ysis of the thumb; when the monkey eventually regained thumb mobility, 
researchers found that the cortical tissue surrounding the initial lesion had 
taken over this function; researchers then removed the newly modified tis-
sue to produce a second paralysis and the same modification of surrounding 
areas gradually occurred again as thumb mobility was restored. The conclu-
sion reached by such studies, Churchland reports, was that “strict localization 
of function was doubtful.”39 Taking on board the first Kant-inspired challenge 
to EM would require neuroscientists at least to consider the possibility that 
the monkey’s thumb influenced the brain and caused its modifications, not 
merely the brain on its own adapting to the loss of tissue. From Kant’s Critical 
standpoint, it is not only the brain that controls the thumb or the thumb that 
controls the brain (a matter that is to be resolved by empirical research), but 
above and beyond both of these causal influences, I (i.e., the possibly illusory 
yet necessary idea of my whole body as a person) control them both.
The second challenge relates to how EM portrays the mind or mental events, 
once they arise. The strict defenders of EM appear at times to be claiming that, 
once neuroscience reaches its heyday and the brain is sufficiently understood, 
we will realize that people do not have beliefs and desires. This is the source of 
the many attempts that have been made to argue that EM is fundamentally self-
contradictory or self-refuting.40 What Kant’s system of perspectives (especially 
as interpreted in the context of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer) can contribute to this 
debate is a realization that the mind or soul or “I” that arises out of the body is 
entirely a product of imagination, yet this imaginary object is the very thing that 
makes possible our ability to explain what we know to be real. The latter claim, 
of course, is unlikely to be attractive to most defenders of EM. When consid-
ering the possibility that the mind-brain relation could be analogous to the 
wave-particle relation in the physics of light, for example, Churchland declares 
that in order for this analogy to hold, “it would have to turn out that mental-
ity is somehow a fundamental property of matter, and for that there is not the 
39   Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 171.
40   For an excellent explanation of why transcendental or quasi-transcendental argu-
ments against EM are bound to fail, see Kenneth Taylor, “How Not To Refute Eliminative 
Materialism,” Philosophical Psychology 7, 1 (June 1994): 101-125. Toward the end of his essay, 
Taylor offers this life-line to anyone who still thinks a transcendental argument against 
EM is possible: a transcendental argument might succeed if it claimed “that folk psychol-
ogy does not, after all, purport to be a robustly causal theory and that supposing other-
wise leads one to incoherence.”
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smallest shred of evidence.”41 This claim is somewhat shocking, coming from 
someone so well-versed in the details of empirical science. For in the field of 
quantum physics it is almost commonplace to find such a possibility affirmed, 
even among the most respected physicists.42 Indeed, taking quantum mechan-
ics into consideration would render my argument even more plausible; hence, 
a version of EM’s prediction that takes on board this second challenge would 
be that future advances in both neuroscience and quantum mechanics will 
enable these two disciplines to draw on each other’s insights in such a way as 
to reveal that, at the very deepest level of the brain’s operation, brain states are 
an expression of free-flowing energy that will turn out to be the best possible 
scientific explanation of what “mental” really means – but not in a way that 
destroys the legitimacy of referring to mental states as explanatory concepts. 
Establishing this may not require proof that mentality exists as a fundamen-
tal property of matter, but it will require evidence that mentality exists as a 
fundamental perspective of matter – e.g., that quarks somehow “experience” 
freedom.43
Whatever EM means by stating that folk psychology will be reduced to neu-
roscience (or, in light of the first challenge, to the holistic interplay between 
neuroscience and human anatomy in general), it cannot mean that we no longer 
have any of the things we now call beliefs and desires; it can mean only that in 
the post-reductionist era, all well-educated persons will realize that, as Kant 
demonstrated, all our ideas (when viewed from the theoretical standpoint) 
have to be regarded as illusions as far as their relevance to empirical science is 
concerned, even though these same ideas remain no less meaningful and no 
less true (when viewed from the practical standpoint) as far as their relevance 
to human morality is concerned. Only by accepting this second challenge 
and interpreting EM perspectivally can its proponents effectively respond to 
criticisms such as Taylor’s (see note 40). Admittedly, in this article I have not 
41   Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 375.
42   To cite but one of many possible examples, Freeman J. Dyson states in his 1985 Gifford 
Lectures, Infinite in All Directions (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 8: “Therefore, I say, 
speaking as a physicist, scientific materialism and religious transcendentalism are neither 
incompatible nor mutually exclusive. We have learned that matter is weird stuff.”
43   For further details on how quantum mechanics can be consistent with Kant’s phi-
losophy, see my articles: “Kantian Causality and Quantum Quarks: The Compatibility 
between Quantum Mechanics and Kant’s Phenomenal World,” THEORIA: An Interna-
tional Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 28, 2 (May 2013): 283-302; 
and “Bohm’s Quantum Causality and its Parallels in Kant’s Ideas of Reason”, in Death and 
Anti-Death, Volume 13: Sixty Years After Albert Einstein (1879-1955), ed. Charles Tandy (Palo 
Alto, Ca.: Ria University Press, 2015), 99-128.
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presented a detailed account of exactly how an argument for limiting the scope 
of EM should be constructed. What I have argued, however, is that such an 
argument should start from a Kantian (perspectival) form of non-dualism and 
that its goal should not be to overthrow EM but to moderate its overly extreme 
claims through perspectival reasoning.
Taking on board these two Kant-inspired challenges would not require the 
rejection of any essential feature of EM. What it does require is a subtle yet 
profound revision of the way its reductionist aims are typically presented to 
the public, a turn not unworthy of being called “Copernican”: instead of view-
ing neurophilosophy merely as a program for reducing the mind in general and 
conscious mental processes in particular to nothing but raw neuroscience and 
the brain functions it describes, proponents of EM must also raise neuroscience 
to the level of the mind. The 1999 movie, “Bicentennial Man,” serves as an inter-
esting thought-experiment regarding what might be involved in such a rever-
sal of the reductionist’s theoretical paradigm. In it, the lead character, a robot 
(played by the late Robin Williams), decides after about two hundred years of 
service to a series of human masters that he wants to become human. In so 
doing, he does not need to change the way his neural circuitry is constructed 
(because the futuristic science of his day had already made him remarkably 
human-like). Rather, he must change certain illusions about what his existence 
entails; most poignantly (especially given the actor’s recent tragic death), he 
must accept the reality that as a human, he must die. Once he agrees to raise 
such illusions (motivated by his love for another) to the level of transcendental 
ideas, his status as a bona fine human being is confirmed.
Only by affirming the meaningfulness of explanatory idealism, of the sort 
Kant defends under the rubric of the “transcendental,” can one consistently 
believe or assert that EM is true. In order to explain their position, elimina-
tive materialists will then be compelled to recognize that the matter cannot be 
quite so monochrome as extreme physicalists typically assume. This perspec-
tival shift does not compromise our ability to take seriously whatever empiri-
cal results the science of the future may bring our way;44 but it will prevent 
us from succumbing to the Cartesian (and extreme EM) error of treating the 
44   An interesting research project would be to produce a computerized simulation of infant 
learning according to Kantian parameters. The project could be designed so that its 
assumptions were compatible with those of EM, insofar as the simulated environment 
would not distinguish between brain states and mental states. The key to making such a 
project “Kantian” would be to give the simulated agent not only a human-like set of neu-
rological structures, but also a growing sense of self-awareness through perception of its 
whole body as a unit out of which its experience arises.
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(non-brain) body as something the mind-brain somehow owns. No philoso-
pher urges us more than Kant does that we are to be ruthlessly rigorous in 
giving science its proper place and in therefore being open to the results of 
empirical inquiries; yet in so doing, the role of a good philosopher of science 
is to ensure that we can encourage such a tough-minded approach without 
adopting background assumptions that would imply we have lost our minds 
altogether.45
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